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WAR, TERROR, AND THE FEDERAL
COURTS, TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11
CONFERENCE

*

Martin S. Lederman: [Note: Introduction and administrative
matters have been REDACTED.] This is the AALS section of Federal
Courts of the AALS, 2012 annual meeting. We’re very, very pleased
to have federal Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh from the D.C. Circuit
joining us for this panel. We thought it would be appropriate, since
1
he is on a virtually weekly basis rewriting Hart and Wechsler, that we
should probably have him come by and say what he can about these
issues. He’s obviously under certain constraints, as are Sarah
[Cleveland] and I because of our involvement in the Executive
Branch, but he will be able to speak at least broadly to some of the
topics that we’ll be discussing, and some of the fascinating federal
courts issues that have come across his desk in the last three or four
years. So it’s great to have you with us, Judge Kavanaugh.
The Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh: Thank you.
Marty Lederman: And then going in order, to my right are Sarah
Cleveland of Columbia, Curt Bradley of Duke, Judith Resnik of Yale,
and Steve Vladeck of the Washington College of Law at American
University. There are three major topics that we’re hoping we’ll have
time to discuss here; and I’ll also mention three minor things that I
don’t know if we’ll have time to get to before the Q&A.
Number one, this panel concerns the intersection of, or the
interaction between, federal courts doctrine and terrorism—that is
post-9/11 litigation of all sorts, such as civil causes of action, various
criminal and military commissions cases, and habeas cases. What is
* This event, held on January 7, 2012, was a part of the Association of American
Law Schools’ Section on Federal Courts program at the 2012 AALS Annual Meeting
in Washington, D.C. This transcript has been edited.
1. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009).
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the interaction? How is federal courts doctrine affecting how the
political branches and courts are dealing with counterterrorism? And
on the other hand, what effects are such terrorism-related issues
having on the content of federal courts doctrines, if any? Which way
is the doctrine pushing the substantive results? . . . and vice versa.
Number two: Numerous very important, contested, hotly debated
topics have arisen in the last ten years, many of them in the Bush
Administration, involving for example interrogation techniques, the
scope of detention authority, habeas review, military commissions,
targeted killings, and the use of force more broadly. On some of
these questions, the federal courts—and the Supreme Court in
particular—have had quite a lot to say; and on others, not so much, at
least in part because of several different federal courts doctrines that
prevent the courts from speaking too much about those. You’re all
familiar with standing limits, political questions, state secrets, etc.
We’re going to focus particularly on a couple of them, which are
2
immunity doctrines and the weakening of the Bivens and state court
sorts of causes of action.
We will also discuss the fact that there are many people who think
the federal courts have become too involved at supervising and
resolving substantive questions involving the political branches,
including some of Judge Kavanaugh’s colleagues, who have been
particularly vocal about that, engaging in what appears to be a form
3
of resistance to the Supreme Court’s Boumediene decision. By
contrast, many other people think the courts have not been nearly
involved enough at resolving some of the unresolved questions about
the scope of interrogation and detention and military commissions
and the like, that might be lingering from the last administration, or
occurring now in the new administration, such as with respect to use
of force. So that’s the second broad topic—whether the federal
courts have been too timid or too aggressive in this area.
The third of our principal topics is the increasingly important role
of international law within federal court adjudication, and how the
federal courts are dealing with international law in several different
respects. The Obama Administration has urged the courts, for
instance, to construe the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
4
Force both as constrained by and as informed by the laws of war.
When I was in OLC between 1994 and 2002, I probably did not spend
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
3. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
4. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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any time at all on the laws of war. But in the twenty or so months that
I spent in the Obama Administration, it seems as if Sarah and I had
approximately forty-two conversations a day about the laws of war.
Sarah H. Cleveland: We didn’t spend any time not on the laws of
war.
Marty Lederman: Right. United States Government actors, both in
the Judicial Branch and otherwise, are deeply immersed in
international law questions, both as a matter of construing federal,
constitutional and statutory law, and trying to figure out what force
international law has of its own accord. We’re going to talk about
that in connection with at least two issues. One is the degree to
which the courts should use international law as a basis of construing
federal, statutory and constitutional authorities, and secondly, the
5
question now arising in the Hamdan case now at the D.C. Circuit,
and I think it’s public that Judge Kavanaugh has unfortunately for us,
been assigned to the panel, so he will not be able to discuss it. But
the question there is the extent to which international law authorizes
the sorts of material support charges that are being brought in
military commissions cases.
The three more minor topics that I hope we’ll touch upon—but if
we don’t, please bring them up in the Qs and As—are: First, the
emergence in several different contexts—such as in habeas cases, in
the construction of the laws of war, and in immunity cases—of what
we might refer to as federal common law. Second, the difficulty of
adjudication where much of the evidence is necessarily classified and
has to be redacted—that is to say, nonpublic adjudication by the
federal courts. It’s not really that common, but Judith has with her a
great prop, one of the most important court of appeals decisions in
6
recent years related to terrorism—Latif. This is what it looks like. I
don’t know if you can all see.
Judith Resnik: [The slip opinion was held up, to show the many
blackouts in the text of the decision.] There’s a lot of black.
Marty Lederman: We know from the tone of Judge Brown’s and
Tatel’s competing opinions that there’s a lot going on in this case . . .
but we don’t know what it is. And it’s now on its way to the Supreme
Court. What’s the Supreme Court supposed to do with this, where
not even the legal question can be publicly clarified?
The third less central issue is a very discrete but important question
that might arise in Hamdan, if and when the government argues that
5. Hamdan v. United States, No. 11-1257 (D.C. Cir. argued May 3, 2012).
6. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 80
U.S.L.W. 3510 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2012) (No. 11-1027).
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whether or not the material support charges are international law
offenses, they are a common law United States domestic offense. Are
there Article III limits to the sorts of criminal prosecutions that
Congress can take out of Article III courts and put in Article I courts?
I don’t know if we’ll get to those three things but I hope we will.
So I’m going to start by posing a question for Sarah in the first
instance: Sarah, to what extent are these federal courts doctrines, in
particular Bivens and official immunity doctrines, preventing the
federal courts from resolving some of the most important substantive
questions, such as permissible means of interrogation, the extent to
which persons apprehended in the United States can be militarily
detained, and the like? President Obama has rejected some of these
as a matter of policy, but the result of those decisions is that we won’t
resolve whether they were legal or not in the last administration and
in the next administration. Many thought we would finally get some
resolution through damages actions, such as Bivens actions and state
court tort actions against contractors. How have the federal courts
been doing? Should they be doing more or less to resolve these
substantive questions, and how do federal courts doctrines affect
whether such questions might be resolved?
Sarah Cleveland: Okay great. So first, thank you to Marty for
including me on this.
I think one of the most important
developments post-9/11 was the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of
the independent role of the Federal Judiciary in reviewing legal
7
questions in the context of an ongoing conflict, you know Hamdi says
the Supreme Court—you know, war is not a blank check for the
Executive and the Supreme Court has a role. The Supreme Court
itself has the two most important and in fact only decisions that
recognize the application of binding law on Guantanamo, and that is
Boumediene recognizing the application of the Suspension Clause and
8
Hamdan recognizing the application of Common Article 3. Those
two decisions, I think have been extraordinarily important in helping
the U.S. Government to bring its detention policies within a rule of
law framework that is internationally recognized and accepted.
And so I think the courts, at least some have not adequately
appreciated the really positive role that judicial review can play in this
context. It can play a very important role in disciplining internal
government conversations about policies and legal principles. It
helps legitimate governmental action externally and it allows, in some
7. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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cases, the political practice to accomplish what may be politically
difficult for them to accomplish on their own.
So if you think back to the civil rights movement—I grew up in
Alabama—this is not a digression. Southern judges who actually
wanted to comply with desegregation orders were much better
positioned politically when they had a court order requiring them to
do it, than if they had it to do on their own. So courts can play all of
these positive things and they have, to some extent, post-9/11, that I
do think that we are seeing in some cases, not all, a combination of
the view that courts are sort of across the board, institutionally illequipped to deal with these questions and therefore, necessarily need
to defer to political branches’ decisions in nearly all circumstances.
And on the other hand, reaching out to the kind of threshold
doctrines that Marty was just talking about; political question,
9
standing, mootness, Bivens, qualified immunity, Westfall Act
substitution, battlefield preemption, all kinds of doctrines.
And the question as to how much of an impact 9/11 has had on
these doctrines, I think can be hard to answer because it depends
what your baseline view is of where the doctrine was before. I mean if
you think Bivens was already dead, then the fact that courts haven’t
been very willing to adjudicate Bivens claims in these contexts is not
10
surprising. If you think as the Seventh Circuit did in the Vance case,
which involves two U.S. citizens who were detained in Iraq during the
conflict there, that the kind of conduct that they allege they were
subjected to would have obviously given rise to a Bivens action had
they been subjected to it in the United States. Then at least some of
the Bivens decisions that have come out of the national security cases
are carving out new spaces for non-application of Bivens to similar
conduct abroad.
I’m of the view that the courts in general have been quite reluctant
to apply domestic law rules, to recognize Bivens damages, actions, in
their application to substantive conduct that would be considered a
constitutional violation that occurred in the United States. And
they’re reluctant for a number of reasons. They generally articulate
this in terms of Bivens special factors. But I think in reality, in most of
the cases, at least in the cases involving Bivens claims by aliens who are
detained abroad, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, that what the
court is really doing is sort of using the finding that there’s no Bivens
claim as pretext for a decision that either qualified immunity applies,
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006).
10. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, No. 101687, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011).
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because the rights were not clearly established at the time, or a
decision on the merits, that the individuals actually had no
substantive constitutional rights. Frankly, I think it would be
preferable if the courts would actually engage with the appropriate
applicable doctrine, rather than sort of mushing it all into the Bivens
context, because you can end up feeling that Bivens is just sort of
expanding so it will never apply in a national security context. I just
spoke to Bivens but that’s enough.
Marty Lederman: I’m going to ask Steve, in a minute, about the
11
Bivens cases and sort of the flipside, which is the Boyle cases in which
federal common law is being interjected to prevent state law claims.
But Judith, taking off from where Sarah started, do you think that
9/11 and the terrorism issues that have arisen after it have affected
these federal courts doctrines one way or the other? Do they look
differently today than they would have? I’ll give you two hypos. One,
if we had never been attacked on 9/11, would all these federal court
doctrines look the way they do now?
Two:
if the Bush
Administration, and the United States generally, had chosen to go
the more European route and used mostly law enforcement and
covert action authorities, rather than treating this as an armed
conflict, would the doctrines look different from the way they do
today?
Judith Resnik: Let me start by underscoring that we’re all in medias
res, in the middle of the story that is unfolding. Moreover, we who sit
on this panel are situated and part of that story; we are all participant
observers—whether as judges, litigators, Executive branch members,
advisors, or commentators. When we talk about the “law” and make
claims about how we understand what “it” is, our discussions are
embedded in what we hope that the “law” will be. This discussion is
one of many that aims to shape the meaning of doctrines that could
move in different directions. We are trying to affect how others
understand the possible parameters and contours. Further, and of
course, in this area as in others, we need to be mindful of the risk of
reifying the federal courts doctrines, as if some set of pillars were
fixed. An easy example is standing, which over the course of fifty
years has changed a good deal.
To turn then to the next layer, intrinsic in the question posed is
another—whether we can differentiate correlation and causation?
Can we identity what effect 9/11 has had, as compared to what would
otherwise have happened in the various aspects of legal doctrines that
11. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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you have raised? Absent 9/11, there could have been a different
presidency, in which case there would have likely have been a
different membership within in the federal judiciary and on the
Supreme Court.
Assuming, in contrast, the same federal judiciary that we have now,
I will argue that a lot of the law would likewise look the same.
Consider some of the rulings the Court has made, and you have
mentioned the Boyle decision. Justice Scalia, in Boyle, found—on
behalf of a five-person majority—a common law immunity for
government contractors, even though Congress had considered but
not enacted such a rule by statute. Informally, some report that Boyle
is a decision that the Justice regrets, because he is usually not
identified as a fan of court development and expansion of federal
common law. Yet Boyle is not so different from recent decisions, such
12
as Connick v. Thompson (also 5–4), which is an opinion that came
down this last Term, and which provides a remarkable degree of
immunity for prosecutors. In that decision, the prosecutor in
13
Louisiana had committed outrageous Brady violations resulting in
the long-term incarceration of an innocent person, John Thompson,
wrongly sentenced to death; Thompson won a jury verdict ordering
the payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages. In my
view, it didn’t take 9/11 for that case to have been decided; given
Boyle and the composition of the Court, Connick would have come out
the same way.
Moreover, those two decisions have something in common with
other court-based lawmaking of the recent past. Take a very different
context: the question of mandatory arbitration and waiver of rights
14
to class actions. In the AT&T v. Concepcion case, the five-Justice
majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, extrapolated from the
15
text and the context of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925,
which, through judicial elaboration over the last three decades, has
obtained its current enormous aegis. The Court held the California
law, finding a boilerplate provision that precludes group-based
arbitrations (in this instance consumer class actions for failure of the
wireless service to properly disclose information on price) to be
unconscionable, was preempted, and the Court ruled that the 1925
FAA required bilateral arbitrations, even when obligations to
arbitrate were not the product of bilaterally negotiated contracts.
12.
13.
14.
15.

131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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Returning to the focus on detention and 9/11, my answer is that
habeas corpus relief for post-conviction relief was going in a
trajectory that has only been accentuated by 9/11, but that path was
neither invented because of nor derivative of 9/11. Thus, many
Supreme Court judgments post-9/11 are not, in my view, “9/11
effects” (again holding aside the question of whether the
composition of the judiciary would have been different).
More generally, I am leery of making the doctrine emerging from
9/11 appear to be exotic. Rather, what those rulings help us to see is
what is ongoing elsewhere in the federal courts (see the limitations
on Bivens).
Turn to the question of the closing-off of constitutionally required
public access to proceedings for detainees by means of the use of
“commissions” instead of courts, which are obligatorily “open.” As I
sit looking out at the audience, I see Marin Levy, who recently
16
published an article in the Duke Law Review that documents
appellate court practices; in five circuit courts, a vast number of
appellate judgments are made on the papers. As I recall her
numbers, something like eighty percent of the cases are decided by
virtue of reviews by staff attorneys and without oral argument.
Should that be called “appeal”? And what happened to “open
courts”? The point is to understand that Guantanamo is on a
continuum, and it is but one of many instances in which
commitments to open court proceedings in the federal adjudicatory
arena have been called into question.
Turn next to what I call “democratic” versus “despotic” detention
and to the decision mentioned at the outset—Latif. That judgment
is, for me, an example of despotic detention in the sense that the
government—the majority in the D.C. Circuit—presumed the
correctness of the evidence that its sibling branch of government,
that is the Executive branch, presented, largely in camera. The legal
question in part is about whether the documentation (produced in
the field, abroad, and under challenging conditions) constitutes a
“regularly-created” government record, making it readily relied on as
such and available to courts, but also whether the material contained
in that documentation should garner presumptions of accuracy. As I
read the majority opinion (with its many blackouts), it seems to build
on its decision that the documentation suffices as a government
record to turn that authority into a presumption that the evidence
16. Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management
in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315 (2011).
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contained therein is correct and sufficient for detention. It’s sort of
slippery when reading the decision (again in part because of the
blackouts) but in the end, it appears that the detainee has to show,
through independent, clear, and convincing evidence, that he should
not be detained. The shift substantially enhances the government
authority to contain and detain individuals.
Moreover, there is an important issue in Latif about the allocation
of authority among trial and appellate courts. The district judge had
found that the government had not met its burden to continue
detention, but the majority (over Judge Tatel’s eloquent dissent) took
it upon itself to decide the evidentiary question again. What makes
the result a despotic regime is the sense that the detaining authority
is presumed to be authorized to detain, yet gains that authority based
on its claims about an individual but in the absence of a trial and
conviction.
Distress about this form of authority is longstanding. One can find
17
it in Cesare Beccaria, who was an eighteenth-century theorist and a
famous criminologist, who discussed the despotic methods of holding
people without having to prove guilt. The great French, American
and other revolutions exemplify a commitment to an alternative—to
what participants thought was a different kind of authority of
government and one that would, I argue, produce “democratic
detention.”
What is democratic detention? Coming to U.S. case law of the midtwentieth century, judges contrasted the democratic practices of this
country with the despotic authoritarianism of totalitarianism, and
that contrast became a leit motif in case law addressing the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth amendments. U.S. constitutional guarantees were
held up in opposition to totalitarian regimes. The relevant case law
comes not only from federal but also from state courts. The concept,
developed in the twentieth century, was that all individuals were
dignified and equal persons before the law.
Democratic detention doesn’t presume the legitimacy of
government actors’ decisions to confine individuals for long terms,
nor does it authorize the use of coercive interrogations. Today, in
contrast, we are seeing a struggle, and some licensing of government
authority that was once understood as falling on the “despotic” side.
And again, while the conflict about whether to use the “criminal law,”
with its democratic protections, or special procedures for 9/11 cases
17. See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES
Co. 1986) (1764).
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is the current prominent site of this debate, the debate and the issues
of linedrawing are happening in other contexts as well.
Another factor is the relevance of the identity of the detainee, and
whether treatment turns on a citizen/non-citizen distinction. The
18
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) is
both a product of and has sparked more discussion about this issue
(listservs are buzzing). The text under section 1021(e) provides that
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law or
authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful
resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are
captured or arrested in the United States.” What has Congress done
or not done? I do not read this text to inscribe the proposition that
citizens are treated differently from non-citizens, for purposes of
detention. But the text does not prohibit it either. What courts will
do on this topic is still evolving, as the decisions related to Bagram
make plain.
What is now being contested, and vividly so in the context of 9/11,
is also under attack in other settings, including those dealing with
migrants, sexual offenders, and prisoners (where a few cases even
assert that a violation of the Eighth Amendment was “de minimis”).
In short, the concept that all persons are holders of dignity rights is
not only put into tension in 9/11, which is not sui generis. Further, if
one thinks that it is important to have the independence of judges, as
embodied in Article III or through other structural protections, that
view is relevant in immigration as well as in 9/11.
Marty Lederman: Steve, picking up from those remarks, is it possible
that either 9/11 itself, or particularly the policy choices of the Bush
and Obama Administrations, will actually push the federal courts to
have a more active role than anyone would have conceived the
federal courts having over the political branches’ conduct of war or
intelligence or national security? To the extent the political branches
are perceived to have been too aggressive, will the courts push back,
19
as some say they did in Rasul and Boumediene? Or do the Bivens cases
and the Boyle cases suggest otherwise? The courts have been very
reluctant to recognize Bivens actions and very quick to cut off state
court actions under the common law, at least as applied to alien
plaintiffs. But is it possible the courts might think differently about
cases brought by U.S. citizens, thereby presaging a new, more

18. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011).
19. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).

CONFERENCE.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/14/2012 7:00 PM

CONFERENCE

1263

aggressive or more activist role for the courts in policing what the
political branches are doing?
Stephen I. Vladeck: Some of the lower court decisions have indeed
suggested that Bivens relief might be available in these cases; others
have come out the other way. There’s a remarkable passage right
toward the end of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene,
which says it’s a happy coincidence of our history that the courts
haven’t had to be particularly involved in answering the complicated
questions about the separation of (and limits on) the government’s
war powers, but that may change. And he doesn’t explain why that
might change. He sort of alludes to the circumstances of the past
decade as the reasons why that might change. But it’s hard to say
what he’s hinting at there, given the courts’ role thus far. So the
lower courts, in some cases, have more of an inclination to supervise
military operations, especially in the cases in which the plaintiffs are
U.S. citizens. Vance is a good example, although now it’s being
reheard en banc by the Seventh Circuit. There are actually five
different pending Bivens cases right now, brought by U.S. citizens,
arising out of various allegations of abuse related to or directly part of
the war on terrorism, or Iraq or Afghanistan operations.
So I think this is a chapter that’s not yet been written, and I think a
lot of it will depend on what happens in the next couple of years in
these (and other) cases. But just to be clear about the reason why
I’m skeptical, Sarah alluded to the Bivens cases, and I think these
cases would have come out the same way without 9/11—it’s just that
the reasoning would be different. Consider for example Rasul v.
20
Myers, which is the second iteration of the post-release damages
claim by four Guantanamo detainees, trying to raise a Bivens claim.
Most of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was about why qualified immunity
would have barred the claim, but then they dropped a single
footnote, which says “oh by the way, there are special factors
counseling hesitation,” and so we also rest on the alternative ground
that we should not recognize a Bivens claim. Now that’s not anything
new for those of you who know Bivens law. Special factors are a
common reason why courts have been cautious to recognize implied
constitutional remedies. But the only special factor that can be
identified here is “the danger of obstructing U.S. national security
policy,” as a special factor unto itself, with no analysis. And so I think
that’s why I’m skeptical.
The Boyle cases are also good examples. Boyle, which Judith
20. 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
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mentioned, is a 1988 Supreme Court decision. It’s about federal
common law preemption of state tort claims, because there’s reason
21
to infer, from the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the same claims
wouldn’t have been available as a federal claim directly, and that
allowing relief under state law in such cases interferes with the federal
government’s interest in protecting the government’s discretion in
how it designs military equipment. Boyle itself was about the design of
a helicopter, and the analogy Justice Scalia drew was to the FTCA’s
discretionary function exception. The cases that have extended Boyle
in the last couple of years have been about the “combat activities”
exception to the FTCA. And so there are a few cases, one by the D.C.
22
Circuit, Saleh v. Titan, and then two in September by the Fourth
23
24
Circuit, Al Shimari and Al-Quraishi, where the courts have said we
can infer from Boyle the same sort of idea that the federal courts have
the power to preempt these state tort claims in order to avoid
interfering with federal policy. But this is what Justice Scalia actually
said in Boyle: “Here, the state imposed duty of care that is the
asserted basis of the contractor’s liability . . . is precisely contrary to
the duty imposed by the government contract.” And so that was why
preemption made sense, that was federal common law was justified.
In contrast, in the combatant activity cases, these are tort suits
arising out of Abu Ghraib, and abuses at other prison facilities
overseas, and it’s hard to see how a tort suit is—to quote Justice
Scalia, “precisely contrary to the duty imposed by the government
contract in those circumstances.” So there’s lawmaking cutting off
these claims—
Marty Lederman: You mean judicial lawmaking.
Steve Vladeck: —Judicial lawmaking cutting off these claims, and
that’s why I’m skeptical, even in these U.S. citizen cases, that this is
sort of a moment for reasserting the federal courts in any other
context than the Boumediene-like context where the issue was
Congress overtly cutting off federal jurisdiction, never mind what the
federal courts are actually going to do with that power.
Marty Lederman: Right. Just for those of you who don’t know, these
are worth watching out for: there are five Bivens cases brought by
21. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
22. 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011).
23. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 101891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
24. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom.
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012)
(en banc).
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U.S. citizens or U.S. persons that are currently percolating, of which
25
the en banc case in the Seventh Circuit, in Vance, and the Meshal
case [in the District Court for the District of Columbia], are probably
the two to watch most carefully. They could be very important cases.
The Boyle cases that Judith and Steve are referring to are state tort
actions against contractors. The Fourth Circuit case that Steve was
talking about is now en banc in the Fourth Circuit. The court
reached out to the Federal Government, to the Obama
Administration, and asked for its views. DOJ has received two
extensions on their brief. I was hoping to be able to tell you today
what their views are, but apparently we’ll have to wait until next
Friday.
Steve Vladeck: But Marty, the Obama Administration was asked for
its views in Saleh.
Marty Lederman: And filed a very careful Supreme Court brief.
Steve Vladeck: That said, we have concerns about the D.C. Circuit’s
analysis but you should deny cert.
Marty Lederman: Correct. So this is something to be on the watch
for, both what the Executive Branch says and what the courts say in
these two areas. You brought up that comment by Justice Kennedy at
the end of Boumediene. It reminded me of Justice O’Connor’s similar
comment in her plurality opinion in Hamdi. I think the theme of
those cases—O’Connor’s and Kennedy’s lesson, as it were, was
something like the following. “To the extent you, the Executive
Branch and Congress, are acting more or less in accord with the way
things have been done in the past and in pursuance of international
law norms and practices that the United States has historically
engaged in, we will sit to review it but we’re going to be pretty
deferential. But to the extent you start deviating and doing things
that are unprecedented or seem to be out of step with the
international law, in Justice O’Connor’s words, ‘this conclusion may
unravel.’” She doesn’t explain whether she means “unravel” as a
matter of statutory interpretation, which is nominally what she was
doing in Hamdi, or some sort of constitutional limit on the political
branches.
We haven’t talked at all yet about Congress and the extent to which
what the courts might reflect what they think the national legislature
would want, even when the legislature has been oblique or silent on
the question. And there’s certainly a theme of that in Judge
Kavanaugh’s quite extensive concurrence in the D.C. Circuit’s denial
25. Meshal v. Higgenbotham, No. 09-2178 (D.D.C. filed May 10, 2010).
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of rehearing en banc in the Al-Bihani case, about the role of
international law in construing the AUMF. But then when it comes
to a case such as Saleh—and I know you might be circumscribed in
what you can say, Judge Kavanaugh—there the courts are creating a
common law defense against a state court action. Based on what? Just
the court’s anxiety about adjudicating such questions, or do you
think you’re channeling what you think the national legislature
wants? How do you think about that question when it’s a common
law question like that?
Judge Kavanaugh: Well, let me say quickly, in response to your
question, that I think the difficulty there reflects the same difficulty
you see in preemption cases throughout the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. Those cases are ultimately about the foreign affairs
preemption doctrine, and as Steve was pointing out, they raise the
question of whether there is an expressed conflict or implied conflict.
Obviously implied conflict preemption is one of the real uncertain
areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence at present, not just in war
powers but in drug manufacturing cases and what have you, involving
state tort liability.
But let me take a step back and give you what I think, if I can, is the
bigger picture of where we are with tort law . . . and more generally
begin by saying thank you for including me in this panel. I benefit
from the scholarship of the people on this panel, such as Marty’s
article [with David Barron on Congress’s authority to regulate the
27
Commander in Chief] that I have here.
Marty Lederman: At lunch we were comparing how many times
Judge Kavanaugh cites to legal scholarship. He really does read your
stuff, so keep writing it!
28
Judge Kavanaugh: Professor Vladeck’s critique, which I have read,
and maybe wince, but I still learn from. (laughter)
Sarah Cleveland: Read but not cited.
Judge Kavanaugh: Yes, read but not cited yet. (laughter)
Steve Vladeck: But see! (laughter)
Judge Kavanaugh: And the people in this room, I want to thank you
for what you do in studying what the courts do and writing about
what the courts do, and I for one learn from what you do. As
Professor Resnik said, this is an ongoing process that we’re in. So
26. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
27. See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb (pts. 1–2), 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 941 (2008).
28. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011).
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thanks to all of you and thanks to the two of you [Sarah and Marty],
for what you did in the Executive Branch, because I know how
challenging that work is, as well.
So where are we? Marty mentioned a word that had not been
mentioned before, which was “Congress.” What’s the big picture of
where we are right now in terms of federal courts, separation of
powers, war powers? I would start with, in the wake of September
11th, Congress authorizing two wars: it authorized the war against AlQaeda and the Taliban, and authorized the war in Iraq. That itself is
a significant precedent. When you ask, twenty years from now, thirty
years from now, what’s the most significant precedent arising out of
the post-9/11 years? I think one of them, if not the most important,
will be that those were congressionally authorized wars. A President,
who in the future tries to engage in an unauthorized ground war of
any significance, will be faced with those precedents used against
them. President Bush obtained authorization for those two wars.
Second. As Marty’s article with David Barron points out so well,
Congress has regulated the Executive’s conduct of war in many
respects, both before and after September 11th. We tend to forget
that and sometimes think, well this is all just the Executive Branch
operating in kind of a free zone, free from congressional restraint.
And in fact, whether it’s interrogation or detention, surveillance, a
number of particulars of how the Executive goes about the war effort,
Congress has been deeply involved, including in the wake of
September 11th. I think it’s very important to remember Congress’s
role there.
And then third—and this was not self-evident on September 12th—
the courts have played a significant role, as Sarah mentioned, in
enforcing restrictions on the Executive’s conduct of war. Where was
the political question doctrine in Hamdi or Hamdan? Nowhere to be
found. Nowhere to be found.
What about the President’s exclusive, preclusive Article II power, to
ignore congressional restrictions or disregard congressional
restrictions, depending on—what’s the scope of that? Not a single
Justice in Hamdi or Hamdan suggested that detention or activities
related to detainees were within the exclusive, preclusive power of the
President. Hamdan, footnote twenty-three, I think, pointedly ends
with, “The government does not argue otherwise.” Which was a
recognition that not even the Executive Branch was asserting in that
case, an exclusive, preclusive power. So the political question
doctrine has not played a major role. The exclusive, preclusive power
of the President was the big issue raised by some of the OLC opinions
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in 2002/2003, but the Bush Administration later backed away from it,
culminating in the January 15, 2009 OLC memo for the file
essentially but publicly retracting or distancing itself from a number
of prior OLC memos. So the courts are playing a role in enforcing
congressional restrictions.
But, then what about these tort doctrines? I think courts still have
reluctance [to recognize causes of action] when Congress has not
regulated a particular activity, has not created a cause of action. The
29
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act for
example, have exceptions that make it such that they haven’t applied
in a lot of these cases. Courts, I think, share the same reluctance they
had before, about Bivens. As Sarah talked about, Bivens had been
narrowed significantly long before September 11th. Preemption
doctrine has been an uncertain area of the law in many areas, and
these state tort suits reflect, I think, part of the uncertain nature of
foreign affairs preemption. What is the role of states in regulating
the war effort? I’ve said that Congress has a significant role in
regulating the war effort, and courts have enforced those
congressional restrictions, but going back to first principles of the
founding, one of the principles of the founding was that war would
be waged by the Federal Government. War and foreign relations
were Federal Government activities primarily, not state government
activities. Maybe it ultimately goes to whether you’re thinking about
conflict preemption or more of a field preemption, which is an issue
that we see in multiple areas. So that is my longwinded response to
your questions about Saleh.
Marty Lederman: Let me invite Curt now to bring international law
into this discussion. And in particular, I’m particularly interested,
mostly because of Judge Kavanaugh’s concurrence in the Al-Bihani en
banc case, and the recent National Defense Authorization Act, about
what the federal courts should assume about the role of international
law when construing U.S. domestic law—in construing the
constitutional war powers and the national security powers of the
political branches in the first instance, but also whether federal
statutes should be construed to comply with and be limited by
international law, in particular the laws of war—something Curt has
written quite a bit about. Now Judge Kavanaugh can correct me if I’m
wrong, but I think it’s fair to say that in his Al-Bihani concurrence he
starts from a presumption that if Congress has been silent on
international law, we should not assume that Congress wanted to
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).

CONFERENCE.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/14/2012 7:00 PM

CONFERENCE

1269

limit the President, let alone guide the President, by the international
laws of war. One should not apply such a presumption and the laws of
war should not bear upon how we construe the President’s war
authorities—something that quite candidly to my ears is an odd
notion, that Congress should be presumed to intend the President to
be able to violate the laws of war.
For the first hundred years or so of the Republic, there was a
shared view of the three branches, that the President’s and
Congress’s own war powers were themselves constrained by the law of
war, and that there was no constitutional authority to go beyond that.
Now we’re not in that era any more. But it is notable that although
the 2001 AUMF made no express reference to international law,
recently Congress has—perhaps picking up on a cue in Judge
Kavanaugh’s concurrence—made several references to international
law in the new Defense Authorization Act and its legislative history.
As Steve and I have argued online, that should take care of the
problem, at least for the time being. I don’t know if it will be
persuasive or not, but Curt, how do you think international law has
been and ought to be influencing the interpretation of statutes?
What is it fair to presume about Congress in the absence of any really
clear cues from the Legislative Branch?
Curtis A. Bradley: This has come up most directly, as Marty
indicated, in connection with how to construe the Authorization for
Use of Military Force that Congress enacted a week after the 9/11
attacks, which broadly authorizes the President to use force against
entities or organizations responsible for the attacks, clearly
encompassing the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban
forces that were harboring them. But it’s a very short and rather
vague statute and the question has come up about whether
international law should be part of the materials that an interpreter
should look to in trying to think about some of the things that are not
really specified in the statute. My own view is that the answer is yes to
that question, that international law should be relevant to that kind
of interpretive enterprise. I differ a little bit with the Judge’s views in
Al-Bihani on that, even though I agree with the Judge as to a lot of
other things he says in the case, and I commend his concurrence in
Al-Bihani in general. He says a lot about why we should worry about
very loose claims that are often made about international law in the
U.S. legal system. I’m quite sympathetic to the thrust of those
comments but I don’t think they are determinative here.
Congress is legislating against the backdrop of not only U.S. history
but U.S. history in the world, in a variety of conflicts in the past. It
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uses language like “use of force” against the backdrop of that
historical experience, experience that has always interacted closely
with the law of nations or international law. The United States has
always embraced international law as relevant in conducting prior
conflicts, and so just as a body of history, international law is going to
be part of the backdrop against which Congress is legislating. Again,
if you look at the first major war on terror decision by the Supreme
Court, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the lead plurality opinion, which holds that
there is a conflict here and that the authorization of force statute that
I mentioned should be read to include the power to detain, not just
use force in the most obvious sense. The O’Connor plurality relied
heavily on international law, and particularly the Geneva
Conventions, reasoning that if you look at international law, when it
refers to certain concepts, it includes the ability to detain the enemy
forces and not just to use direct force against them. Now you might
say, well that’s just an interpretation to help the Executive, but that’s
actually not true. In Hamdi, the plurality goes out of its way to say
that there are some things the Executive cannot do. For example,
indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is ruled out of
bounds in Hamdi, kind of in dicta, because it wasn’t an issue in the
case. But why? Because the international law didn’t seem to
contemplate it. So the courts have already indicated that it seems
relevant.
Moreover, the current Executive Branch, which is involved in
litigation, has expressly conceded that international law is a relevant
set of materials to potentially constrain its own authority in this
context. It is the agent responsible for carrying out Congress’s
mandate and under normal deference principles, one would ask
whether we have a concession against interest here that is deserving
of deference, and I believe that in this context it is. It’s already been
mentioned, but Congress now has very recently, finally addressed
detention issues—and here I would criticize the administration for
generally resisting congressional involvement, after having so many
people for so long call for more congressional involvement.
Congress did a lot of things the administration I think did not like,
but it did refer to the law of war, which seems to further confirm
international law’s relevance, since the law of war is a body of law that
includes treaties and custom. Now, none of what I just said, I should
emphasize, requires one to think that un-ratified treaties, non-selfexecuting treaties, or customary norms that haven’t been embraced
and incorporated by Congress, are operating independently in the
U.S. legal system. Those are separate difficult questions. It’s just
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about whether, when Congress legislates in this way, whether this is
part of the material that one could reasonably look to, in trying to
figure out what Congress meant.
The other thing I would emphasize is that, under the approach I
am defending, international law is not dispositive of the question. If
one found as an interpreter that in many conflicts the United States
did various things that may not be fully consistent with international
law, that material would be quite relevant and probably more
relevant, since Congress is probably more aware of and more
appreciative of its own historical practice as a U.S. institution and its
Executive’s practice. But my point is simply that one should not rule
out international law in thinking about that.
Marty asked more generally, how do we think about international
law in interpreting materials beyond this enactment? There is a
canon of construction, which has been around since the Marshall
Court in the early 1800s, that is named after the boat in a case that’s
30
called the Charming Betsy case.
And even the modern Supreme
Court has endorsed this canon in a number of cases, and it applies
when interpreting a statute, if the statute is found to be ambiguous—
and I need to emphasize that requirement of ambiguity. If the
statute is found to be ambiguous, courts should try to interpret it in a
way that avoids putting the U.S. in breach of international law.
Now here’s where I probably diverge from some of the panelists,
although in agreement with Judge Kavanaugh, I think that the
Charming Betsy canon has little to tell us about a statute like the
authorization of force statute after 9/11. Why? It is not a statute
where if the court has interpreted it one way or the other, the United
States is placed in breach of international law or not placed in
breach. The question is simply, how to construe the amount of
authority, given from one democratically accountable institution to
the other, the Executive, and how the war on terror is managed
would then be determined by that politically accountable institution,
the Executive Branch. And whether the United States happens to
breach international law in some of those choices will ultimately be
determined by the electorally accountable institution, not by some
misconstruction of the statute, which is what I think the Charming
Betsy canon is most designed to address. It’s not really designed for
big grants of enforcement discretion to the Executive, since again,
the construction wouldn’t place the United States in breach. But I
don’t think you need it here anyway, even though a lot of people do
30. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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invoke it in this context. I think the better argument is, international
law and U.S. history and obviously the text of the statute and other
31
related statutes like the Military Commissions Act, in my view, are
part of the materials one would normally look to in trying to figure
out what Congress meant.
Marty Lederman: I’m going to let Judge Kavanaugh respond to that
directly, because this is such a rich topic. But after you do so, Judge,
I’m going to ask Judith and then Sarah to offer any additional words
they have about international law. Sarah and I—and Bob Taylor and
Trevor Morrison, in the audience here, and many others in the
Executive branch—were deeply involved every day not only in trying
to construe the AUMF not to violate the laws of war, but also to try to
find the proper analogies, as Justice O’Connor suggested in Hamdi,
to try to understand how past practices under the laws of war, in
other kinds of conflicts, should be understood in terms of construing
this statute.
Judge Kavanaugh: I think I’d start again, from the big picture,
which is that courts review Executive action in times of war. That’s
32
the lesson of Hamdi and Hamdan and Youngstown, and you can go
throughout our history, it’s been reinforced strongly by the Supreme
Court.
The courts will enforce statutory restrictions on the
President’s conduct of war as well. And separately, the Executive
Branch and Congress should, as I said upfront in my concurrence,
should pay attention to international law obligations when thinking
about what to put in the statutes. And when the Executive Branch is
exercising its discretion pursuant to an authorization for the use of
military force, or the President’s Article II authority. So courts have a
role and Congress and the Executive should pay attention, close
attention of course, to international law principles. Congress, on
many occasions, has taken international law principles and put them
into federal statutes, sometimes directly, by borrowing from the
principle that’s at hand, sometimes by just having a reference, as in
Hamdan, to international law or the laws of war more generally or the
law of nations more generally.
The difficult question comes when there’s an authorization for the
use of military force, and a court is presented with the question
whether to restrain the Executive in the conduct of war, and
31. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
32. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Congress has not done what it’s done so many times, which is to take
the international law principle and put it into a statute, or to refer
generally to international laws. Should courts nonetheless, restrain
the Executive’s conduct of war, based on a principle that Congress
has not expressly put into the statute? And I start with background
notions of judicial restraint in times of war. That’s not judicial
abdication—again, the lesson of Hamdi and Hamdan and
Boumediene—but judicial restraint. And if Congress hasn’t put a
restriction in and if the Executive action is not something that’s
concrete or our history talks about, or is contrary to something that
the Executive has done before, may a court reach out and say, we’re
going to restrain the Executive nonetheless, because we think it’s
contrary to international law?
Now what’s the difference in practice? Judge Williams, I think had
a separate opinion that was very similar to what Curt Bradley has
suggested here, and ultimately said there’s probably not much
daylight, if any at all, between how this would work under his view of
deference to the Executive’s interpretation of international law and
my view of how the court should go about it. So the practical
significance of this may be quite small, but it does suggest, as Marty
points out, to the extent it prompts Congress—this principle, I’m not
suggesting this opinion. But the idea that this principle is out there
prompts Congress to pay attention to whether they want to refer to
international law, so much for the better, because as I started with, I
think it’s a good thing when Congress pays attention to international
law principles. I think it’s a good thing when the Executive pays
attention to international law principles for purposes of our
international relations and otherwise.
Marty Lederman: I will say, I mean it’s certainly something that we
in the Executive Branch, were concerned with, including as to a
bunch of different issues that will never be adjudicated, such as the
use of force more broadly in this kind of an unusual conflict that is
relatively unregulated directly by treaties and customary law. How
does one, for instance, treat civilians who are not part of the enemy
but are somehow in association with the enemy? How should they be
treated? What is the proper analogy?
Judith Resnik: On the big picture, I was actually just looking at my
watch and thinking we’re an hour into talking about 9/11, and we
haven’t used the word “torture” yet—as one of the major 9/11 effects.
This point is not simply free-floating, for the practice of torture
relates to the role of both comparative law and international law in
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33

U.S. courts. Specifically, the Miranda decision that Chief Justice Earl
Warren wrote is drenched with comparative law—about how Scotland
and India and other countries do or do not engage in coercive
interrogation. The dissent, in turn, doesn’t object to the referencing
of other countries, but on occasion disagrees with the majority’s
characterization of the practice in that country.
I should add that in the nineteenth century, when ruling on a
claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court
referenced jurisdictions outside the United States. Only more
recently—after the 1989 decision when Justice Scalia raised his
34
objection —did the debate heat up about the legitimacy of looking
beyond this country’s case law and practices. Non-U.S. law has been
informing the understanding of either our own law and/or what our
law might be. Further, what we think of as “our law” does not come
wholly from within; the precepts were not manufactured exclusively
inside our borders. A classic example is the “due process” clause—
whose language builds on England and France, and whose
interpretation has been informed by evolving understandings of what
constitutes “fairness.”
So coming back to Sarah’s initial launch about whether courts are
well or not well equipped to provide particular kinds of judgment
and oversight, that question is another “federal courts” leit motif.
Debates are plentiful about what can and should courts do, and
about what they can’t or should not do. Mention was made of the
South, which was a paradigm for that debate—in the context of both
questions of desegregation and of the treatment of prisoners. And
actually, in terms of our dealing with the challenges that 9/11
detainees pose, the U.S. criminal justice system has been thinking
about questions of force and interrogation for the last half a century
and more; courts are well equipped, in the sense of being practiced
in, dealing with various forms of fear and risks that certain
defendants pose.
Let me add on the capacity point the publication of a relatively new
Federal Judicial Center study, called National Security Cases: Special
35
Case-Management Challenges that goes case-by-case through a large
number of cases to try to map how the courts are or are not

33. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
34. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
35. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL SECURITY CASE
STUDIES:
SPECIAL CASE-MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES (2010), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ts100222.pdf/$file/ts100222.pdf.
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responding to challenges and to the claims of the need for special
procedures.
I wanted to come back to Judge Kavanaugh’s important point
about the notion of a court avoiding advocating or taking positions. I
think courts should not abstain from becoming involved. What’s
needed is an incredibly thick conversation about terribly difficult
problems, and we need all branches to participate.
Therefore, I think it important to highlight a paragraph in the
majority opinion in the much blacked-out Latif opinion. The
majority wrote: “Boumediene’s airy suppositions have caused great
difficulty for the Executive and the courts. Boumediene fundamentally
altered the calculus of war, guaranteeing the benefit of intelligence
that might be gained—even from high-value detainees—is
outweighed by the systemic cost of defending detention decisions.
Boumediene’s logic is compelling: take no prisoners. Point taken.”
I found this paragraph both troubling and shocking. To suggest
that court rulings are a source of a problem and that the government
would respond to a complex ruling by shooting people is, I think,
wrong. So too is the dismissal of the hard work of five members of
the Supreme Court as “airy suppositions.” To argue that, in the face
of tremendously challenging legal issues, courts should be silent is to
suggest a form of abdication that we should firmly reject. Courts have
been generative contributors—in the U.S. and elsewhere—to
debating very hard questions about the sources of rights of
individuals, the needs for safeguarding communities, the obligations
of government, and the proper and improper exercises of authority.
Marty Lederman: I agree with Judith. I think that is an important
paragraph that took me aback —the disturbing suggestion by Judge
Brown that the Executive Branch would adopt a policy of “take no
prisoners,” which would be in violation of the law of war.
Sarah, I want to stress another passage in Boumediene that may be
relevant to our discussion—an exchange between Justices Kennedy
and Scalia. Justice Kennedy had to go to pains to distinguish
36
Eisentrager.
He says, in particular, that at the Landsberg Prison,
unlike at Guantanamo, the United States was acting as part of a
multinational force there and engaging in conduct that was in
coordination [with] our European allies. Justice Scalia is just
incredulous that Justice Kennedy suggests that such a distinction has
constitutional valance: What does this have to do with whether we
should have habeas review?, he argues. You’re telling me the fact
36. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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that the Germans were onboard there matters to whether we should
have the power to review the Executive’s conduct? And Kennedy’s
implicit response is “Yes, it matters a whole lot, because the Executive
is checked when it’s acting in accordance with international law, and
it is part of the international community; whereas if the Executive
acts alone, untethered to its allies, it might more likely start acting in
ways—and this is similar to the O’Connor Hamdi opinion—that
deviate quite significantly from international norms and historical
norms, which is when the courts will be most inclined to step in. So
Sarah, are these two themes at loggerheads? To the extent the
Executive Branch and Congress are more cognizant of international
law and international organizations, is it true there’s less need for the
Judiciary to play an oversight role?
Sarah Cleveland: Well, I would also read the Kennedy-Scalia
exchange in Boumediene as going to the question of the level of
independent U.S. control over a particular circumstance.
So
Landsberg Prison in Johnson v. Eisentrager is different from
Guantanamo because it was in Germany, not on a U.S. military base,
in an area under exclusive legal U.S. jurisdiction and control, but
actually subject to a sovereign interaction of multiple countries. The
question of when a country’s own domestic legal obligations apply in
acts of territorial context, in which they act with other countries, is a
very complicated one and it’s one that arises in many contexts. It was
not implicated in Boumediene.
I have found the conversation between international law and U.S.
domestic law, and with the courts on this issue, quite fascinating. The
original premise behind the Charming Betsy doctrine is that Congress
should be presumed not to have violated international law, unless
they make it clear that they are doing so, because having federal
legislation that puts the U.S. in violation of international law causes
significant problems for the United States, with unintended
consequences that could spiral out of control and significantly
adversely impact U.S.-international relations. So whether Congress
knew about a particular international law rule or not, so Charming
Betsy says, we’ll assume that they didn’t mean to violate it, unless
there’s evidence otherwise. As Curt indicated, I think it’s particularly
historically appropriate to look to international law in legislation
involving armed conflict, since armed conflict is generally
transnational and it’s heavily regulated by international law.
International law is playing a very important role here, not only as
a limit, but also as empowering the Executive Branch, right? I mean,
Hamdi looks to international law to find that the President has the
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power to detain a U.S. citizen in the face of a statute that says you
can’t. That’s a pretty robust role for international law and the
question is where in the AUMF would you find this power if you
weren’t looking to international law? So if looking to international
law in that manner is appropriate, then the other questions is don’t
the limits in international law also get carried with it, so that if
international law recognizes the power to detain in armed conflicts,
that power that comes from international law also is limited by the
scope of international laws relating to detention?
So interestingly, in this, the Bush Administration argued to the
courts that international law didn’t limit what it wanted to do, and
the courts pushed back and said no, actually international law does.
And then the Obama Administration comes in and says international
law limits what we do, and at least some judges have come back and
said no it doesn’t.
Marty Lederman: In fairness to Judge Kavanaugh, he argued that it
shouldn’t be viewed as a limit until Congress speaks clearly.
Sarah Cleveland: Right. I mean, so should courts restrain the
Executive—as Judge Kavanaugh put it in this context—is sort of an
interesting question to ask, when it was the Executive going in and
saying, we are limited by international law. And then the court comes
in and says, actually no you’re not. I think in this kind of context,
courts need to appreciate they are not neutral, right? When they
issue a decision, they alter the legal baseline against which the
Executive Branch and Congress are operating. And so if courts come
in and say no you’re not, then I mean, as in the Al-Bihani case, the
Administration actually went back in, in the en banc proceeding, and
said well actually, really we are, we really mean it. International law
really does what we want to say our authority is. And I think in this
context in particular, when the Executive Branch is onboard and
there’s a long history and it’s an area in which international law has
tradition, well then it seems that that has to be correct.
On Curt’s point on Charming Betsy, I think I would be inclined to
give somewhat more of a robust role for the Charming Betsy doctrine,
and construction of the Authorization of the Use of Military Force
the Court suggested, because of course no judicial construction of
AUMF is going to be an abstract. It will always be in relation to some
intended action by the government. And so then the question is,
does the AUMF authorize acts? Does the AUMF authorize the
detention of a doctor who is a member of Doctors Without Borders—
this is a hypothetical—or not? And in that context, it seems to me
that what you’re saying is the AUMF is presumed not to have
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authorized the President to violate international law and therefore
would be presumed not to authorize someone who would be a
protected—the detention of someone who would be a protected
person under international law.
Marty Lederman: So Steve, let’s try to tie a lot of these threads
together in the context of the Hamdan case, which I urge you all to
keep an eye on as it is litigated in the D.C. Circuit. Steve, in the
Military Commissions Act (MCA) we have this interesting dynamic in
which the political branch has spoken directly to international law,
and possibly to the “domestic law of war.” Congress, in the 2006
Military Commission Act, provided that military commissions could
adjudicate prosecutions for “material support” to terrorist
organizations, Al-Qaeda in particular, i.e., supporting such an
organization without proof that the defendant was actually engaged
in helping the organization achieve a particular law of war violation
or terrorist act—merely general support, such as Hamdan being bin
Laden’s bodyguard and driver, that sort of thing. Such a material
support offense is now found in our own Title 18 as a criminal law
offense that can be tried in an Article III court, but it wasn’t in Title
18 at the time Hamdan acted, at least as to his conduct. Congress said
that’s a violation of the law of war that can be prosecuted in a military
commission.
When the MCA was being amended in 2009, the Obama
Administration came in and urged Congress to remove this offense,
with both Jeh Johnson, the General Counsel at the Pentagon, and
David Kris, the National Security Division head at DOJ, testifying to
the effect that “our experts believe there is a significant risk that
appellate courts will conclude that material support for terrorism is
not a traditional law of war offense, thereby reversing hard-won
convictions and leading to questions about the system’s legitimacy.”
Congress went ahead and recodified the offense, however, and
Hamdan had already been convicted of the offense under the 2006
act. So Congress did not take the Executive Branch’s view on this. It
instead said no, we think this is a law of war offense.
Here the legislature has taken a fairly aggressive view—one that is
not, I think it is fair to say, the majority view around the world of what
international law prohibits. In upholding Hamdan’s conviction, the
Court of Military Commission Review relied principally on some
convictions at Nuremberg by Telford Taylor, under a theory that has
been . . . let’s put it this way, ignored by international law thereafter.
And it’s now before the D.C. Circuit. (So Judge Kavanaugh will not
be able to opine on this issue here.)
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I have two questions for you. Number one, is this within Congress’s
define and punish power, to say that this is an offense, even if it’s not
the majority view around the world? And second, even if it’s not an
international law offense, does Congress have the power to create
“domestic law of war offenses” that can be tried not in Article III
courts but in these special military courts? Could you speak to those?
Steve Vladeck: Let me also add, I think there’s a threshold question,
which is even when the answers to those questions are yes, can
Congress apply that offense retroactively to conduct that took place
before 2006?
Marty Lederman: Oh I’m sorry that’s right, there’s a huge ex post
facto question, too.
Steve Vladeck: So let me just say for the sake of argument, and let
me underline that this is just for the sake of argument, that Congress
has the power to do this prospectively. I think there’s still a question
of whether you can apply a new offense retroactively in that context.
Marty Lederman: Correct.
Steve Vladeck: On the point whether Congress can create such an
offense in the abstract, I think that really depends on how we are to
37
understand the Law of Nations Clause, which provides that Congress
has the power to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations. It’s fairly clear from the constitutional convention, the
notes, and so on, that the goal was not to give Congress a completely
unlimited power to say that anything was a violation of the law of
nations. If Congress did have such power, it could say that having a
gun near a school was a violation of the law of nations, or a state’s
failure to provide civil remedies for gender motivated crimes of
violence was a violation of the law of nations, which would come as a
38
39
shock I think, to the Lopez and Morrison Courts.
Obviously, then, there’s some constraint. The question is how
much interpretive constraint is there on Congress’s power to decide
for itself which offenses are recognized under the “law of nations”?
My own view is that the constraint has to be certainly no weaker than
the constraints that the Supreme Court has imposed on Congress’s
other Article I powers, but that in the context of military
commissions, they have to be stronger. And the reason for that is
twofold. First, it’s worth reminding ourselves why can certain
offenses be tried by military courts in the first place. When the
Supreme Court has grappled with the question, the answer has always
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
38. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
39. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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been because the Fifth Amendment has an express exception for
cases arising in the land and naval forces in the Grand Jury
Indictment Clause, and because Article III and the Sixth Amendment
have an implied exception to the Petit Jury Clause for such offenses.
40
This is reflected in Quirin. When the Court says the reason why it
doesn’t violate the Sixth Amendment to try the saboteurs before a
military commission, it is because we understand the Sixth
Amendment, the right to jury trial, to not apply to “offenses
committed by enemy belligerents against the law of war.” So Quirin
itself tied the Sixth Amendment question to what the content of the
laws of war is, independent of what Congress says the context of the
laws of war is.
So the first piece of this is, even if Congress could define an offense
triable in civilian court, what about the jury trial problem with respect
to trying the offense before a military commission? The second
aspect is, let’s just say for the moment it’s not a law of nations offense;
let’s assume it is a domestic common law—
Marty Lederman: On that first question, to what extent should the
judiciary defer to Congress’s interpretation of the laws of war,
especially if it tracks Telford Taylor’s interpretation?
Steve Vladeck: Well, I mean I think—this is ironic, because I think
41
it’s the same question that arises in Alien Tort Statute litigation,
about just how far we go and just actually what the law of nations is. I
think the answer has to be, in the criminal context, we apply the most
narrow approach that seems reasonable—what Justice Black
described as “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.”
When the Congress is creating criminal liability in the abstract, we
might even hold Congress to the same standards that Justice Souter
42
would hold courts to under Sosa, which is that there must be definite
and near universal acceptance of this part of the laws of war.
Marty Lederman: We could have a debate among our panelists just
about that.
Judith Resnik: I’m in disagreement.
Steve Vladeck: But before we get to that question, let me briefly
jump to the other problem with the government’s position. In
Hamdan, the government now argues that the offense Hamdan was
convicted of is an offense against the “domestic common law of war.”
But that raises a separate Article III question.
Marty Lederman: Right.
40. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
41. 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2006).
42. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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Steve Vladeck: And the reason why that’s true is that to the extent
Quirin is precedent, Quirin says it is okay to try violations of the laws of
war in military commissions, but the offense being tried in the
military commission here may not in fact be a proper violation of the
laws of war.
Marty Lederman: The international laws of war?
Steve Vladeck: By the international laws of war. Then it’s a question
of first impression about whether military jurisdiction is appropriate,
even over domestic criminal law offenses derived from the domestic
common law of war. Quirin doesn’t speak to that at all, and I think
there are some fair arguments as to why the answer to that should be
no.
Judith Resnik: Let me just domesticate that one second. Let me
take a moment to note that this is a standard “federal courts”
question—about when a non-Article III court is permissible. Recall
43
that just last term, in Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court held that
a bankruptcy judge, who holds a fourteen-year appointment, has no
jurisdiction over a cross-claim on a fraudulent transfer that arose
under state law and that related to the bankruptcy litigation. Other
case law addresses whether federal magistrate judges can take felony
pleas, and what forms of “consent” can be inferred from participation
or non-objection. We hear little about the idea that “consent” should
be required for detainees to be tried before the non-Article III
military commissions.
The 9/11 commissions/trial debate has been framed by asking
about the paradigm of the criminal trial or not. Another frame is to
bring the issue inside the fold of ordinary federal courts doctrine,
and to ask about the permissibility of using non-Article III judges.
This Court had drawn relatively bright lines, last term, around the
44
power of bankruptcy judges, just as it did in the Plaut decision,
which held several years ago that Congress can’t retroactively create
jurisdiction for cases that the courts wrongly dismissed by virtue of
misinterpreting congressional intent on statutes of limitations for
claims alleging securities fraud. Given Plaut and Stern imposing
limits, why does calling the issue “terror” and “national security”
avoid this issue and transform the conversation?
Marty Lederman: I’ve been wondering when someone would point
this out. I’d been thinking that this bankruptcy case, the Anna
Nicole Smith case that the Supreme Court decided last year, which
43. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
44. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
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could be the topic of a whole federal courts section here, is actually
right now maybe the strongest precedent for Hamdan going forward,
in terms of the Article III argument.
Steve Vladeck: I think there is a strong case already.
Marty Lederman: But Judith is absolutely right—in quite distinct
circumstances, the Supreme Court majority is offering what may be
the strongest arguments for aliens in terrorism cases. For example, if
one looks at last Term’s cases about personal jurisdiction, and the
45
Nicastro case in particular, the plurality opinion, written by Justice
Kennedy and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, is probably the strongest articulation that I can recall of the
robust protections of the Due Process Clause to foreigners overseas—
namely, foreign corporations. And you’d think that would have some
overlap when it comes to the question of due process rights of
foreigners being detained by the United States.
Steve Vladeck: And the Chief Justice wrote Stern v. Marshall too.
Marty Lederman: We’ll see whether these opinions have any play
when it comes to Guantanamo cases.
Curt, you have a quick response and then I want to go to Q&A for
half an hour.
Curtis Bradley: Everybody knows the Sosa opinion, which is the 2004
decision involving the Alien Tort Statute. Reading it, it is all about
limits on judicial power. The ATS is a one-sentence statute from 1789
that does not in any way lay out the possible claims one could bring,
nor did the intent of 1789 Congress help at all in 2004. The Court
kind of had to resurrect what it called the ambient law of an era in
bringing it forward. Justice Souter said we know there are lots of
problems with judges doing that, one of which is that probably a lot
of these suits the political branches won’t even like, because they’ll
upset other countries. So we really have to be concerned, and it’s not
enough to ask whether there is international law relevant to the case,
and the Court adopted what it thought was a very strict test for when
you’d ever have an ATS claim, because of the limits on judicial power
and the lack of any guidance from Congress. Now, I’m not saying I
disagree with your bottom line, but it’s a very different scenario when
Congress actually does define the law of nations, and there’s at least
an argument, putting aside the criminal versus civil point which you
made, which is a good one, that at that point there is a much greater
basis for judicial deference, when it’s not the courts’ own power
they’re worried about, but the powers of the accountable legislature.
45. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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Marty Lederman: I know you were all worried we wouldn’t get to the
46
ATS and Kiobel here, but now we have . . . and so I think that’s a cue
to open it up to the floor for questions. Please tell us who you are and
where you’re from, and try to keep your questions brief so that we
have time for a useful dialogue.
Judith Resnik: We answered them all.
Peter Margulies: I’ll come up with one. Peter Margulies from Roger
Williams Law School.
I have a question about one of the
47
extraordinary rendition cases, the Arar case, in which we send
someone allegedly to Syria, who ended up getting tortured for a good
part of a year, before we discovered he was apparently not involved
with terrorism at all.
So then the Canadian Government
acknowledged, in a report a couple of years later—the Canadians also
pay Mr. Arar $10 million for his pains. We have said, the government
has said that that case is one in which the Bivens factors counsel
hesitation mean that this lawsuit cannot proceed; the Second Circuit
in an en banc decision, agreed with the Executive Branch. But
exactly what factors counseling hesitation are we talking about in that
case? We’re talking about an error that the Canadians themselves
acknowledged. Perhaps we’re talking about embarrassing Syria, but
recent events in Syria should show that the Syrian Government is well
beyond embarrassment. So why not entertain the lawsuit?
Marty Lederman: Who wants to answer that question? I’m going to
play devil’s advocate a little bit. I think what’s going on—what the
courts might say and what they did say there—is that rejection of
damages is supposed to be a default presumption unless and until
Congress decides what to do, and there’s no stomach in the
American Legislative Branch currently for damages actions, even for
wrongdoing by the Executive Branch in this context. That would be
the argument—that unless and until Congress steps in and says okay,
as the Canadian political branches did, far be it for the Judicial
Branch to start permitting damages actions.
Steve Vladeck: You know, but there’s a contrary argument that Jim
Pfander, among others, has made I think quite powerfully, which is
that there are plenty of examples—well, two very common
examples—of Congress actually expressing agreement and
acceptance of Bivens. And so the notion that this is all sort of judge46. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct.
1738 (2012) (mem.) (setting the case for reargument during the October 2012
Term).
47. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010).
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made law with no legislative clues, I think is a bit off. But I think the
real point here is one Judge Kavanaugh made, which I think had that
been the basis for the majority opinion in Saleh, as opposed to what
Judge Silberman actually wrote, would have been a lot more
interesting, which is the idea of sort of a field preemption, you know
when it comes to claims arising out of war. And I think if that’s really
the sentiment that’s going on here, if that was behind the Second
Circuit in Arar, saying rendition is a special factor, the D.C. Circuit
saying it interferes with national security policy special factor, I think
that’s problematic, because it suggests that Congress somehow has to
act positively, to open the door to remedies that were otherwise
previously available the second that we cross into a war footing, even
for things that either aren’t on the ballot yet or seem unrelated to the
common outcome here.
Marty Lederman: Anyone else want to speak to that? Sarah?
Sarah Cleveland: So just on this, I mean the ironic thing about the
Arar decision is of course there are other bases for bringing damages
claims for acts of torture or complicity in torture that Congress had
adopted. Congress has adopted a statute, the TVPA, that allows
foreign nationals, or at least people subjected to torture under color
of you know, foreign law, to bring claims alleging torture in the U.S.
State tort law would allow such claims. So in that context it’s not—it
wouldn’t seem that controversial for a U.S. court to adjudicate a
Bivens damages action arising on U.S. soil.
One thing that I found particularly troubling about the Second
Circuit’s Bivens analysis in Arar is that they essentially bootstrap a state
secrets analysis into the Bivens reasoning, so that the mere cost that
the court might have to think about the possibility that classified
information might have had something to do with some part of this
you know, conduct in this case, was a special factor counseling
hesitation and therefore Bivens applied, and no claim. Whereas
actually the court—so the state secret stuff that has been articulated
most recently by the Ninth Circuit, and according to the Executive
Branch’s own internal procedures, requires a much more rigorous
analysis of whether or not classified information really is implicated,
how central it is to the litigation, and from the Executive Branch’s
side, whether it’s going to assert it. You don’t need to think about
any of that in a Bivens case, and all you have to do is think well maybe
there is classified information and in the claims.
Judith Resnik: Reading the Second Circuit decision in Arar makes
plain that, when sitting en banc, there was a deep divide. The four
dissenters each wrote to express their own objections—Judges Parker,
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Pooler, Sack and Calabresi, all of whom had very different
understandings of the role for courts and access to them than did the
majority written by Judge Cabranes.
I also wanted to come back to the question of preemption, the
possible use of state law, and the role of federal judges in making law
on these issues. Consider the doctrines of field preemption, the
dormant foreign affairs preemption, and preemption based on the
view of some impact on or relationship to war. Over the last few
decades, federal judges have developed these common law doctrines
in an extensive fashion to conclude that if, somehow the issues of
foreign affairs, or war, or international interests, are in play, that
states cannot legislate and courts should both find preemption and
defer to federal executive or legislative enactments. The lower court
decisions build on various Supreme Court decisions, including the
48
Crosby case involving what Massachusetts’s legislation prohibiting
state imports because of labor conditions in what was then called
49
Burma and the Garamendi decision, about California’s requirement
that to do business in that state, insurance companies had to detail
their involvement in banking in Europe during the Holocaust.
Federal court jurisprudence regularly asks about the sources for
judges’ authority. If one wants to have judges understand themselves
as limited, then the expansion of “preemption” is problematic. When
lower court judges rely on a bucket called “foreign affairs” or loosely
use the word “war,” they are extrapolating from the silence of
Congress and the Constitution, to shut off state lawmaking. What
should be the grounds, what level of specificity ought to be there, by
the Executive Branch or Congress, to displace the role of states? And
when should the courts themselves say they can’t address issues? The
presumption in a federation should be on a multiplicity of
participants in lawmaking.
Marty Lederman: I think Judith brings up a point that both she and
Sarah raised earlier, that I think is very important. There’s this
general assumption out there that the Courts of Appeals have
abdicated, and that the D.C. Circuit has, for instance, become a
rubber stamp for detention in the habeas cases. I think that’s a
mistake. I think there’s still a very vibrant debate going on among the
judges, as demonstrated by the splits in Al-Bihani and Latif, and I
think it gives lie to Judge Silberman’s claim that no judge is ever
going to rule against the government in these cases. Vicki?
48. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
49. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
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Vicki Jackson: So the question I was thinking about is not a
doctrinal question, but I was thinking about Charles Black’s idea that
when the courts are reviewing government action, that they—you
know, we think of them as checking. But there also is an important
measure of legitimate. And then I was thinking about arguments that
have been made in a comparative context—you’ll forgive me—
particularly about the High Court or Supreme Court of Israel, which
took very full jurisdiction, full justiciability over claims arising in the
occupied territories, about the scope of ongoing military operations,
while they were occurring, a habeas-like review of detention, I mean a
huge range of things, which you know, it was argued in the literature
that this was in part legitimate. It said if the claim doesn’t succeed,
and sometimes that prisoners won and sometimes they lost, but it
suggested that there was law in the story. And I’m just thinking about
the debates that I’ve heard, because I don’t have the expertise that
this wonderful panel has, in all of the Bivens cases and the like, in the
lower courts—I’ve read some but not all of them—of whether those
concerns about the legitimacy that comes from courts being there to
perform a checking function, is not relevant in our story, or is
different. It’s not a very pointed question, but I’d just be interested
in your reflections on it.
Curtis Bradley: I just have a quick thought for that. I’m so glad you
brought that up, Vicki, because I am in general in agreement with the
recent endorsement of the role of the courts that has been
mentioned from the beginning, a somewhat surprising intervention
of the courts in trying to supervise some of these liberties implicated
by the war on terror. But there is kind of a dark side to it too, which
tends to be brushed over a little bit, which I think you’re touching
on. One can argue that the Supreme Court, despite kind of
minimalist decisions, has given some legitimacy to indefinite military
detention without trial. That should not be an uncontroversial
proposition. In fact it wasn’t uncontroversial early on. It has become
less controversial, even though the Supreme Court has not released a
single person itself, but there’s the general idea that people could be
held without a trial, in Guantanamo, as long as they’re not U.S.
citizens, for their lifetime. It should be a very dramatic, significantly
controversial proposition, and it is much less so because we have
judicial review in the backdrop.
Marty Lederman: Trevor.
Trevor Morrison: I think it’s been a terrific panel. My question is
what we should think the content is of judicial restraint. So the
question is about how active should the court be, but I think there’s,
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in at least some contexts, disagreement over what it would mean for a
court to be restrained. And I was thinking of this in the context of
Judge Kavanaugh’s really important opinion in Al-Bihani. It’s
exhausting to read, so I can’t imagine writing it.
There’s a footnote there Judge, I’ll paraphrase, where you say
something—it’s actually after running through the various arguments
for why Charming Betsy doesn’t apply, et cetera and so on. It says
ultimately also, the courts need to be very wary about endorsing as
legally correct, a restrained interpretation of Executive power
proffered by the Executive Branch.
Judge Kavanaugh: Oh right.
Trevor Morrison: And because it’s something like the reverse of a
loaded gun, I guess. It’s like emptying out a gun, why leave it to be
loaded for the next guy.
So in other words it’s that this
administration might take a more narrow view, but the danger is that
that’s going to then kind of strain the next administration. I think
maybe there’s a sort of compare cite to the Chief’s opinion in
50
“Peekaboo” (PCAOB), where he says something similar. And so
there’s a concept of deference there that I think is quite complicated
to think through. Part A of the question is I’d love to hear more
about your thoughts on that, but Part B is why is it that the restrained
position isn’t saying we don’t need to decide in this case? We can
accept the government’s position that its detention authority is
lawful, and that in doing that, it says it’s acting consistently with
international law, and we shouldn’t decide more in this case. My
conception of judicial restraint would ordinarily be in this area,
courts should slide to the side less rather than more, and so it’s an
interesting account of restraint, that entails deciding more and in
contrary to the Executive Branch.
Judge Kavanaugh: I think that’s a fair critique of why did I do this.
It took a long time, why was it necessary? I’ve mentioned before, as a
practical matter. Marty and others here have used the term
international norms and historical norms interchangeably, to the
extent those two things are the same. This is not going to make a
practical difference because they’re under the approach I articulated.
Historical norms will constrain the interpretation of the AUMF. I
thought it was an important point though, to reemphasize something
I had said before in written opinions, and something that I believe
very strongly and have said today, which is the central role of
50. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010).
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Congress in war powers issues, which is not necessarily something
that was evident in the immediate wake of September 11th or going
back really since the post-World War II era. When Congress imposes
limits on the Executive Branch’s conduct of war, courts will enforce
those limits and again, Hamdi and Hamdan are the measure of that.
I have a narrow conception for example, of the political question
doctrine. I have a narrow conception of what’s exclusive preclusive
power, that the President can ignore Congress. But when Congress
has not put something into the statute, has not put something in,
how should the courts then act? Just to reiterate, Congress puts
international law restrictions either by cross reference or by
incorporating them itself, quite often. Why do it and why cite? The
Chief had just said this, in Free Enterprise v. PCAOB, that was a majority
opinion, so something I’m paying attention to, case I had written at
the lower court, a dissent in, and he made the point that just because
the Executive Branch interprets Article II more narrowly than we do,
it’s not the Executive’s role to—the Executive may want to tie its own
hands, but it can’t tie the hands of future presidents. That was the
statement of the Chief and I just quoted that there.
In terms of deferring to the Executive, sure if they want to release
the person, that’s the ultimate. If they think they’re detaining
someone in violation of international law, they can release the
person, but to the extent they come to court, it’s usually up to the
courts to decide whether the tools of statutory construction and the
like.
Marty Lederman: We have about twelve or thirteen minutes left. Sir,
could you identify yourself?
David Frakt: Hi, I’m David Frakt from Barry Law School, and actually
my question goes directly to what Judge Kavanaugh was just saying,
and it’s something that’s been bothering me for a couple of years. I
represented a detainee at Guantanamo, in both the military
commission and on habeas, and as we were getting very close to the
hearing of the merits, the Justice Department changed their mind
and decided that my client, Mohammed Jawad, was not, and was
being unlawfully held, and asked the judge to grant the habeas
petition, which he did. So you would think at that point that he
would be released, but he wasn’t right away, because Congress had
passed a waiting period notification, that the Executive Branch had to
notify Congress and there had to be a waiting period before a
detainee could be transferred or released to a third country. So I
wanted to ask you guys to comment on that, from a constitutional
perspective.
Does Congress have that power?
Because they
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subsequently imposed a lot more of these waiting periods or transfer
requirements. I think the President just did a signing statement on
the NDAA, saying that he wasn’t sure if that was constitutional. Any
thoughts on that question?
51
Judge Kavanaugh: I have opined about a case called Kiyemba, that
the President does not have exclusive preclusive power with respect
to transfers, and thus Congress can regulate transfers, about the
signing statement last week. And that was ultimately where the Bush
Administration ultimately came eventually to, in a Steve Bradbury
final OLC opinion in January of 2009, that the President does not
have exclusive preclusive power with respect to transfer, meaning
Congress can regulate the transfer of detainees. The signing
statement last weekend does have an interesting, I would say vague,
reference to potential uncertain exclusive presidential power.
Marty Lederman: Would this be the case in which it would be
unconstitutional: If there is no affirmative legal authority to hold
someone, and Congress has said you have to hold them anyway, for a
particular period of time and give us notice? If the Executive decides
it made a mistake, we shouldn’t have had this guy in the first place, is
that transfer restriction constitutional then? Is there a tension with
the President’s constitutional obligation to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed?
Judge Kavanaugh: There’s a tension with what does “release” mean
in Boumediene ultimately, and that can bump—I think that’s what
you’re getting to, what does release entail if Congress has essentially
prevented the release? There’s a question about release into the
United States, release to foreign countries. None of that has been
teed up yet, it hasn’t come to pass. The Executive has been able to
transfer everyone who has had a release order to a foreign country.
Marty Lederman: Or make an offer of transfer.
Judge Kavanaugh: Or give an offer.
Steve Vladeck: It happened in that context, but Judge Kavanaugh
may be too modest, because he’s written the majority opinion in
52
Omar v. McHugh, which is about the sort of—
Marty Lederman: I told you, he’s rewriting the law.
Steve Vladeck: No, but I mean I think Omar v. McHugh, I think is
actually one of the most important decisions to come out of the D.C.
Circuit in the last couple of years, because I think it’s transformative,
or at least trans-substantive in the sense that it’s going to go beyond
51. Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880
(2010).
52. 646 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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the Guantanamo context. Omar is about whether an individual—
53
Omar was one of the detainees who was in Munaf v. Geren, a U.S.
citizen being held in Iraq, and the question that was finally before the
D.C. Circuit in Omar II, whether the Foreign Affairs Reform and
54
Restructuring Act, which purports to bar judicial review of claims
arriving under the torture convention, except in the context of
deportation proceedings, validly takes away that habeas jurisdiction of
the federal courts, or whether in fact it violates the Suspension
Clause. And I think a fair summary of Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion is
that he concluded that it did not violate the Suspension Clause,
although I think there are a couple of different bases for the holding,
one of which being that perhaps Congress actually repealed whatever
right to challenge transfers that FARRA had provided. The other
being that Congress had validly taken away statutory jurisdiction, even
though it hadn’t repealed the statutory right. I actually think Omar
matters a lot more to David’s question than we might realize, because
if the Suspension Clause doesn’t protect that kind of claim, I worry
about why it would protect the transfer claim in the case David
describes.
Judge Kavanaugh: The precise issue in Omar was someone being
transferred to another country—and the Supreme Court had had an
issue like this in Munaf, who claimed he did not want to go. He did
not want to be transferred to the foreign country because of the
possibility of torture in the foreign country. The Supreme Court said
unanimously in Munaf, there is no due process or constitutional
right, even for an American citizen, to get a judicial order preventing
a transfer because of the possibility of torture in a foreign country, so
long as the Executive had certified that it was not more probable than
not that he’d be tortured.
We had a similar issue in Omar, which helpfully raised the statutory
question. It’s very complicated. I think Munaf is an extremely
important case. I’m not sure if Omar is as important as Munaf. I’ll
leave it at that.
Marty Lederman: Laura Donohue.
Laura Donohue: Thanks. Laura Donohue, Georgetown Law. I want
to come back Sarah, to something that you mentioned, and as a
challenge Judge Kavanaugh, to your faith in the Judiciary to step up
and the courts to step up. You mentioned Hamdan and these other
55
cases, but Jeppesen and the torture question, I think is an enormous
53. 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006).
55. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
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elephant in the room that really has to be addressed. In Jeppesen, this
was that the government stepped in before Jeppesen even answered
the complaint, before they even had a chance to step into the lawsuit
itself. And the Ninth Circuit in that case, was very uneasy about their
decision and the impact, and also pled with Congress to do
something about this, because of this enormous area that it opened
up, that torture could not be alleged in a U.S. courtroom under any
circumstances, on the basis of that suit. The reason this is concerning
is it turns out that during the Bush Administration, there were more
than a hundred times that the government actually invoked state
secrets, and dozens more are pending, dealing with contractors
specifically, and these cover a wide range of suits. They involve
environmental charges, personal injury, wrongful death. They
involve patent disputes, copyright, and they deflect the extent to
which what was an Executive privilege, is now a form of private
indemnity for these contractors in these suits, and while they signed
agreements with the State Department or Defense, that they won’t be
prosecuted under Iraq or Afghani law, they come into a U.S.
courtroom and state secrets arises, and lo and behold, this judicially
created doctrine gets them off the hook, so there is no sense of
accountability in the courtroom.
Now, you talked about the conduct of war. CACI International
conducted interrogations, they built the bases, they come into a U.S.
courtroom, they claim state secrets. And the problem is that
Congress, there are constitutional challenges if the legislature steps
up. So my real question is, with torture a major issue, in this—you
speak about Omar. Well, we will receive a grievance. The inability to
even have these suits come forward and to have many similar suits
that are dismissed, that have to do with contractors under state
secrets doctrine, somewhat undermines this believe in the courts as
playing role in the common law hostilities.
Marty Lederman: Laura’s question ties into the other areas I was
hoping we would get to, such as how to reconcile the need to
preserve legitimate secrets and the importance of adjudicating the
legality of the government’s conduct. Moreover, as Laura points out,
this is another example of judicially created common law—courts are
kicking cases out based on their own common law, just as is in the
Boyle cases. Does anyone want to address this quickly? We have time
for only one more question. Can you talk in two minutes, about
secrecy?
banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
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Judith Resnik: The idea is that everyone has rights of access to
courts, but the question is what is a court? My argument is that
courts, operating in democracies, are defined by their provision of
equal treatment of all litigants, by open access so that third parties
can come freely and without permission to observe, by independent
judges, and by procedural fairness. This definition is one of the
reasons that the creation of military commissions on Guantanamo are
so troubling. Yet the issue of openness is not only a problem there.
In the Ninth Circuit Jeppesen oral argument, before the court en banc,
the lawyer representing Jeppesen was asked to leave the courtroom
while the government continued to argue.
The current plan for “commission” trials is broad, and thus far,
judges have not insisted that their obligations include openness as a
matter of constitutional right, as contrasted with government largess.
We need to understand that the 9/11 cases are part of the larger
picture, and when rights of equal and dignified treatment erode
there, they are also eroding in other arenas seeking to be seen as
legitimate as “adjudicatory” venues. And of course, it is not only in
national security cases, but also in other criminal cases that the
government says—and may well have good reason to say—that there
need to be secrets. So I think your question needs to be framed not
only in the war-on-terror context or the torture context, because it’s a
broader set of claims that are being made. Some of the responses
and new procedures are undermining what it means to the court.
Marty Lederman: I’m told that because of the business meeting, this
has to be very short, so sir, if you could make it very short and the
response is short.
Joseph Dellapenna: Joe Dellapenna from Villanova University. It’s
one thing to say that a plaintiff’s suit must be dismissed because of
state secrets, but there’s an even more troubling dimension. I spend
a lot of time working with foreign lawyers, and in terms of how our
courts are involved in these, the things I find most shocking is the
idea that the decision to keep someone in prison, whether as a result
of criminal prosecution or a detention hearing, can be based upon
secret information, they find that the most troubling feature, and
they inform me that in their country, the government is put to a
choice. You either keep the information secret or you keep the
prisoner, but not both.
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Marty Lederman: That’s typically our tradition too, in the criminal
context of course, and the question is whether, in the habeas context,
that traditional norm is being called into question, as the heavily
redacted opinion in the Latif case might suggest.
Please give a round of applause to our great panelists.

